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Since the seminal work of Ramsey [1928], optimal growth models have played a
central role in modern macroeconomics. Classical growth theory relies on the as-
sumption that labor is supplied in ¯xed amounts, although the original paper of
Ramsey did include the disutility of labor as an argument in consumers' utility
functions. Subsequent research in applied macroeconomics (theories of business
cycles °uctuations) have reassessed the role of labor-leisure choice in the pro-
cess of growth. Nowadays, intertemporal models with elastic labor continue to
be the standard setting used to model many issues in applied macroeconomics.
Lagrange multiplier techniques have facilitated considerably the analysis of
constrained optimization problems. The applications of those techniques in
the analysis of intertemporal models inherits most of the tractability found
in a ¯nite setting. However, the passage to an in¯nite dimensional setting
raises additional questions. These questions concern both the extension of the
Lagrangean in an in¯nite dimensional setting as well as the representation of
the Lagrange multipliers as a summable sequence.
Our purpose is to prove existence of competitive equilibrium for the basic
neoclassical model with elastic labor using some recent results (see Le Van
and Saglam [2004]) concerning the existence of Lagrange multipliers in in¯nite
dimensional spaces and their representation as a summable sequence.
Previous work addressing existence of competitive equilibrium issues in in-
tertemporal models attacks the problem of existence from an abstract point
of view. Following the early work of Peleg and Yaari [1970], this approach is
based on separation arguments applied to arbitrary vector spaces (see see Be-
wley [1972], Bewley [1982], Aliprantis et al. [1997], Dana and Le Van [1991]).
The advantage of this approach is that it yields general results capable of ap-
plication in a wide variety of speci¯c models but they require a high level of
abstraction.
Dynamic optimizing models where in¯nitely-lived heterogeneous agents max-
imize their lifetime utilities in perfect foresight equilibrium settings have, to
date, concentrated on perfectly inelastic labor supply cases. In a complete
market model, Le Van and Vailakis [2003] have studied the so-called reduced
form associated with the welfare maximization problem in a single-sector model
with inelastic labor supply. Many di±culties arise when they prove conver-
gence of the optimal path due to the fact that the Pareto-optimum problem is
non-stationary. Their arguments exploit the fact that the stationary problem
involving only the agents with a discount factor equal to the maximum one has
a unique stable state ks. This property enable them to prove the consumption
paths of all agents with a discount factor equal to the maximum one converge
to strictly positive limit points. Subsequently, by using this limit points, they
1de¯ne a sequence of prices as the marginal utility and prove that the sequence of
prices belong to l1
+ (see Lemma 9 in Le Van and Vailakis [2003]). This method,
with some additional assumptions1, also has been used in Le Van and Vailakis
[2004] to prove the existence of competitive equilibrium in a model with one
representative agent and elastic labor supply.
Recently, C. Le Van, M.H. Nguyen and Y. Vailakis [2007] extend the canon-
ical representative Ramsey model to include heterogeneous agents and elastic
labor supply where supermodularity is used to establish the convergence of op-
timal paths. The novelty in their works is that relatively impatient consumers
have their consumption and leisure converging to zero as time tends towards
in¯nity. However, they did not prove the existence of competitive equilibrium
of the economy and the method used in Le Van and Vailakis [2003] could not
apply due to the presence of leisure. The purpose of this paper is to complete
this important point. Our approach is based on the result of existence of La-
grange multipliers of the Pareto problem and their representation as a summable
sequence to de¯ne the sequence of prices and wage as these multipliers rather
than marginal utility as usual. Following the Negishi approach, our strategy for
tackling the question of existence relies on exploiting the link between Pareto-
optima and competitive equilibria. We show that there exists a Lagrange mul-
tiplier as a price system such that together with the Pareto-optimal solution
they constitute a price equilibrium with transfers. These transfers depend on
the individual weights involved in the social welfare function. An equilibrium
exists provided that there is a set of welfare weights such that the corresponding
transfers equal zero.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we present the
model and provide su±cient conditions on the objective function and the con-
straint functions so that Lagrangean multipliers can be presented by an l1
+ se-
quence. We characterize some dynamic properties of the Pareto optimal paths
of capital and of consumption-leisure. In particular, we prove that the optimal
consumption and leisure paths of the most impatient agents will converge to
zero in the long run, with a very elementary proof compared to the one in C. Le
Van, M-H. Nguyen and Y. Vailakis [2007] which uses supermodularity for lattice
programming. In section 3, we prove the existence of competitive equilibrium
by using the Negishi approach and the Brouwer ¯xed point theorem.
1They used assumptions
u(²;²)





for the proof kt > 0 for all t:
22 The model
We consider an intertemporal model with m ¸ 1 consumers and one ¯rm. The





t) where ¯i 2
(0;1) is the discount factor. At date t; agent i consumes the quantity ci
t, spends a
quantity of leisure li
t and supplies a quantity of labor Li
t. Production possibilities
are presented by the gross production function F and a physical depreciation
± 2 (0;1): Denote F(kt;
Pm
i=1(1 ¡ li




We next specify a set of restrictions imposed on preferences and production
technology.2 The assumptions on period utility function ui : R2
+ ! R are as
follows:
Assumption U1: ui is continuous, concave, increasing on R2
+ and strictly
increasing, strictly concave on R2
++.
Assumption U2: ui(0;0) = 0:
Assumption U3: ui is twice continuously di®erentiable on R2
++ with partial
derivatives satisfying the Inada conditions: limc!0 ui
c(c;l) = +1; 8l > 0 and
liml!0 ui
l(c;l) = +1; 8c > 0.
The assumptions on the production function F : R2
+ ! R+ are as follows:
Assumption F1: F is continuous, concave, increasing on R2
+ and strictly
increasing, strictly concave on R2
++.
Assumption F2: F(0;0) = 0:
Assumption F3: F is twice continuously di®erentiable on R2
++ with partial
derivatives satisfying the Inada conditions: limk!0 Fk(k;1) = +1; limk!+1
Fk(k;m) < ± and limL!0 FL(k;L) = +1; 8k > 0:
For any initial condition k0 ¸ 0; when a sequence k = (k0;k1;k2;:::;kt;:::)
such that 0 · kt+1 · f(kt;m) for all t, we say it is feasible from k0 and we denote
the class of feasible capital paths by ¦(k0): Let ct = (c1
t;c2
t;:::cm
t ) denote the
m-vector of consumptions and lt = (l1
t;l2
t;:::lm
t ) denote m-vector of leisure of all
agents at date t: A pair of consumption-leisure sequences (c;l) = ((c0;l0);(c1;l1);:::)








t)) and 0 · li
t · 18t:
The set of feasible from k0 consumption-leisure is denoted by
P
(k0): Assump-
tion F3 implies that
2We relaxed some important assumptions in the literature. For example, the convex cone
of zero of the production set (Bewley [1972]) or the strictly positiveness of derivatives of utility
functions on R
L
+ ( Bewley [1982]). The utility functions in our model may not di®erentiable
in R
2
+ from which many di±culties arise when we deal with boundary points.
3fk(+1;m) = Fk(+1;m) + (1 ¡ ±) < 1;
fk(0;m) = Fk(0;m) + (1 ¡ ±) > 1:
From above, it follows that there exists k > 0 such that: (i) f(k;m) = k ,
(ii) k > k implies f(k;m) < k, (iii) k < k implies f(k;m) > k: Therefore for
any k 2 ¦(k0); we have 0 · kt · max(k0;k): Thus, a feasible sequence k 2 l1
+
which in turn implies a feasible sequence (c;l) 2 l1
+ £ [0;1]1:
In what follows, we ¯rst study the Pareto optimum problem from which we
obtain the Lagrange multipliers in l1
+. Then these multipliers will be used to
de¯ne prices and wages systems for the equilibrium.
Let ¢ = f´1;´2;:::;´mj´i ¸ 0 and
Pm
i=0 ´i = 1g. Given a vector of welfare





















t ¸ 0; li
t ¸ 0; li
t · 1; 8i;8t
kt ¸ 0; 8t and k0 given.
It is well known that any Pareto-e±cient allocation can be represented as the
solution to Pareto optimum problem. By varying the welfare weights it is
possible to trace the economy's utility possibility frontier. Following the Negishi
approach, this procedure can also be used to prove the existence of a price
system that supports Pareto-optima and characterize competitive equilibria as
a set of welfare weights such that the associated transfer payments are zero.
Note that, for all k0 ¸ 0; 0 · kt · max(k0;k); then 0 · ci
t · f(max(k0;k);m)


































x = (c;k;l) 2 (l1
























t (x) = ¡ci
t;8t;8i = 1:::m
©3
t(x) = ¡kt; 8t
©4i
t (x) = ¡li
t;8t;8i = 1:::m
©5i
t (x) = li






t ); 8t;8i = 1:::m
The Pareto problem can be written as:
minF(x)
s.t:©(x) · 0;x 2 (l1





+ )m £ l1
+ £ (l1
+ )m ! R [ f+1g
© = (©t)t=0:::1 : (l1
+ )m £ l1
+ £ (l1
+ )m ! R [ f+1g
Let C = dom(F) = fx 2 (l1
+ )m £ l1
+ £ (l1
+ )mjF(x) < +1g
¡ = dom(©) = fx 2 (l1
+ )m £ l1
+ £ (l1
+ )mj©t(x) < +1; 8tg:
The following theorem follows from Theorem1 and Theorem2 in Le Van and
Saglam [2004].
Theorem 1 Let x; y 2 (l1
+ )m £ l1
+ £ (l1




xt if t · T
yt if t > T
Suppose that two following assumptions are satis¯ed:
T1: If x 2 C; y 2 (l1
+ )m £ l1
+ £ (l1
+ )m satisfy 8T ¸ T0, xT(x;y) 2 C then
F(xT(x;y)) ! F(x) when T ! 1:
T2: If x 2 ¡; y 2 ¡ and xT(x;y) 2 ¡; 8T ¸ T0, then
a) ©t(xT(x;y)) ! ©t(x)as T ! 1
b) 9Ms:t:8T ¸ T0;k©t(xT(x;y))k · M
c) 8N ¸ T0; lim
t!1
[©t(xT(x;y)) ¡ ©t(y)] = 0




5Suppose xT(x¤;x) 2 C \ ¡: Then, there exists ¤ 2 l1
+nf0g such that
F(x) + ¤©(x) ¸ F(x¤) + ¤©(x¤); 8x 2 (C \ ¡)
and ¤©(x¤) = 0:
Obviously, for any ´ 2 ¢, an optimal path will depend on ´: In what
follows, we will suppress ´ and denote by (ci¤;k¤;Li¤;li¤) any optimal path for
each agent i if possible. The following proposition characterize the Lagrange
multipliers of the Pareto problem.




















t ¸ 0; li
t ¸ 0; li
t · 1; 8i;8t
kt ¸ 0; 8t and k0 given.
















































































































t )] = 0 (2)
¸2i
t ci¤
t = 0;8i = 1:::m (3)
¸3
tk¤
t = 0 (4)
¸4i
t li¤
t = 0;8i = 1:::m (5)
¸5i
t (1 ¡ li¤




t ) ¡ f¸1
tg + f¸2i








t g ¡ f¸5i



















denote the projection on the jth component of the subdi®erential of function u
at (ci¤
t ;li¤
t ) and the function f at (k¤
t;L¤
t)3
Proof: We show that the Slater condition holds. Since fk(0;m) > 1;4 as in
the Theorem2 in Le Van - Saglam [2004]. then for all k0 > 0; there exists some
0 < b k < k0 such that: 0 < b k < f(b k;m) and 0 < b k < f(k0;m):Thus, there exists
two small positive numbers "; "1 such that:
0 < b k + " < f(b k;m ¡ "1) and 0 < b k + " < f(k0;m ¡ "1):






























































= " + b k ¡ f(b k;m ¡ "1) < 0
©1
t(x) = " + b k ¡ f(b k;m ¡ "1) < 0; 8t ¸ 2
©2i




< 0; 8t ¸ 0;8i = 1:::m
3For a concave function f de¯ned on R
n;@f(x) denotes the subdi®erential of f at x: We
have to write the ¯rst-order conditions by the subgradient set since at the point (0;0), the
functions u
i and f are not assumed to be di®erentiable.
4As the Remark 6.1.1 in LeVan and Dana [2003], assumption fk(0;1) > 1 is equivalent to
the Adequacy Assumption in Bewley (1972) and this assumption is crucial to have equilibrium
prices in l
1
+ since it implies that the production set has an interior point. Subsequenctly,
it allows using a separation theorem in the in¯nite dimensional space to derive Lagrange
multipliers.
7©3
0(x) = ¡k0 < 0;
©3
t(x) = ¡b k < 0 8t ¸ 1:
©4i
t (x) = ¡
"1
m





¡ 1 < 0; 8t ¸ 0;8i = 1:::m
Therefore the Slater condition is satis¯ed.
It is obvious that, 8T; xT(x¤;x) belongs to (l1
+ )m £ l1
+ £ (l1
+ )m:
As in Le Van-Saglam 2004, Assumption T2 is satis¯ed. We now check
Assumption T1:
For any e x 2 C;e e x 2 (l1
+ )m £ l1
+ £ (l1
+ )m such that for any T; xT(e x;e e x) 2 C
we have



















As e e x 2 (l1




je e ctj < +1 ; there exists a > 0;8t;je e ctj · a:

























i ! 0 :
Hence, F(xT(e x;e e x)) ! F(e x) when T ! 1:Taking account of the Theorem 1,
we get (1) - (6).
Obviously, \m
i=1ri(dom(ui)) 6= ; where ri(dom(ui)) is the relative interior of















We then get (7) - (9) as the Kuhn-Tucker ¯rst-order conditions.
Let us denote I = fi j´i > 0g, ¯ = maxf¯iji 2 Ig, I1 = fi 2 I j ¯i = ¯g and
I2 = fi 2 I j ¯i < ¯g:
In the following proposition, we will prove the positiveness of the optimal
capital, consumption and leisure paths which will be used later.
Proposition 2 i) If k0 > 0; the capital optimal paths k¤
t > 0;8t:
ii) If ´i > 0 then ci¤
t > 0; li¤
t > 0 8t:
The proof is given in the Appendix. C. Le Van, M.H. Nguyen and Y. Vailakis
[2007] did not prove the positiveness of consumption and leisure paths. For the
capital path, by choosing only one agent in an alternative path, our proof is
8simpler since it does not require to consider two separated cases of one agent
and more than one agents.
We now show that the consumption and leisure paths of all agents with a
discount factor less than the maximum one converge to zero. The proof is very
simple compared to the one in C. Le Van, M.H. Nguyen and Y. Vailakis [2007]
which uses the supermodular structure inspired by lattice programming.
Proposition 3 If (k¤;ci¤;li¤) denotes the optimal path starting from k0; then
8i 2 I2; ci¤
t ¡! 0 and li¤
t ¡! 0:
Proof: Let















t)) + (1 ¡ ±)kt :





s.t. 0 · kt+1 · F(kt;m) + (1 ¡ ±)kt
k0 is given.
Assume that there exist i2 2 I2 and a subsequence (c¤i2
¿ ) which converges to
ci2 > 0 when ¿ ! 1: Let a small " > 0 and i1 2 I1. At the time t = ¿; consider








¿ ;8i 2 Infi1;i2g
iii) li
¿ = l¤i
¿ ; 8i 2 I;


































































¯ )¿ ! 0 when ¿ ! 1; ci1
¿ is bounded,
¢¿(") > 0 when ¿ ! 1: We get a contradiction. Hence 8i 2 I2; ci¤
t ¡! 0 .
Similarly, we can prove that li¤
t ¡! 0 8i 2 I2:
3 Existence of competitive equilibrium
Let us now give the characterization of equilibrium. For each consumer i, let
denote:
A sequence of prices (p0; p1;:::) 2 l1
+nf0g;a price r > 0 for the initial capital
stock.




t denote the quantity
which agent i consumes at date t:
A sequence of capital stocks k = (k0;k1;:::kt;:::) where k0 is the initial en-
dowment of capital. Denote ®i > 0 be the share the pro¯t of the ¯rm owned
by consumer i;
Pm
i=1 ®i = 1; #i > 0 be the share of initial endowment owned
by consumer i,
Pm
i=1 #i = 1 and #i k0 be the endowment of consumer i. Let
denote li = (li
0;li
1;:::;li
t;:::); Li = (Li
0;Li
1;:::;Li
t;:::);w = (w0;w1;::::;wt;:::) be
the sequences of leisure, labor supply and wage, respectively.
De¯nition 1 A competitive equilibrium for this model is de¯ned as follows.
With an allocation fci¤;k¤;li¤;Li¤g, one can associate a price sequence p¤ for
consumption good; a wage sequence w¤ for labor and a price r for the initial
capital stock k0 such that
i)
c¤ 2 l1
+ ;li¤ 2 l1
+ ;Li¤ 2 l1
+ ;k¤ 2 l1
+ ;
p¤ 2 l+
1 nf0g;w¤ 2 l+
1 nf0g;r > 0:



















where ¼¤ is the maximum pro¯t of the single ¯rm.































for the Pareto problem. In what follow, we want to prove, with the optimal
path (c¤; k¤;l¤;L¤); one can associate a sequence of prices p¤















t); and a price r > 0 for the initial capital stock
k0 such that ( c¤; k¤;l¤;L¤;p¤;w¤;r ) is a price equilibrium with transfers. We
next show that, there exists a set of welfare weights such that these transfers
equal to zero.
Lemma 1 Let k0 > 0: The sequence of prices p¤

















Proof: See in the Appendix.
Now we de¯ne a price equilibrium with transfers
De¯nition 2 A given allocation fci¤;k¤;li¤;Li¤g, together with a price se-
quence p¤ for consumption good; a wage sequence w¤ for labor and a price r for
the initial capital stock k0 which constitute a price equilibrium with transfers if
i)
c¤ 2 (l1
+ )m;l¤ 2 (l1
+ )m;L¤ 2 (l1
+ )m;k¤ 2 l1
+ ;
p¤ 2 l+
1 nf0g;w¤ 2 l+
1 nf0g; r > 0
























































t = 1 ¡ Li¤
t and k¤
0 = k0







t) for any t
and r = ¸1
0[Fk(k0;0) + 1 ¡ ±].
Then fc¤;k¤;L¤;p¤;w¤;rg is a price equilibrium with transfers .
Proof: See in the Appendix.
The appropriate transfer to each consumer is the amount that just allows the
consumer to a®ord the consumption stream allocated by the social optimization






























A competitive equilibrium for this economy corresponds to a set of welfare
weights ´ 2 ¢ such that these transfers equal to zero.
Proposition 4 i) Let k0 > 0. Then for any ´ 2 ¢, ¼¤(´) ¸ 0:
ii) If ´i = 0 then 8t; ci¤
t = 0; li¤
t = 0 and Ái(´) < 0:
12Proof: i) Let (k0;0;0;:::) 2 ¦(k0): Then
¼¤(´) ¸ ¸1
0(´)[F(k0;0) + (1 ¡ ±)k0] ¡ rk0
= ¸1
0(´)[F(k0;0) + (1 ¡ ±)k0] ¡ ¸1
0(´)[Fk(k0;0) + 1 ¡ ±]k0
¸ 0:
ii) Let ´i = 0: Suppose for simplicity that ci¤
0 > 0:
Let j satis¯es ´j > 0: De¯ne ci¤¤





0 : We have
´iui(ci¤¤
0 ;li¤
0 ) = ´iui(ci¤
0 ;li¤









Hence we get new utility is greater than the optimum which leads to contradic-
tion. Now, assume that li¤
0 > 0: Let j satis¯es ´j > 0: De¯ne
c
j¤¤


















0 ) = ´iui(ci¤
0 ;li¤









that also leads to contradiction. Thus, ci¤
t = 0; li¤





















t(´)¡#irk0 ¡ ®i¼¤(´) < 0:
For given ´; properties in the Proposition 2 , k¤
t > 0; ci¤
t > 0; li¤
t > 0











t): Thus, Ái(:) is a
function of ´: The following theorem is a direct application of Brouwer's ¯xed
point theorem.
Theorem 3 Let k0 > 0. Then there exists ´ 2 ¢;´ >> 0; such that Ái(´) =
0;8i . That means there exists an equilibrium.
Proof: First, we prove that Ái(:) is a continuous function of ´ for every i: Let
´n 2 ¢ and ´n ! ´ 2 ¢: We shall prove that Ái(´n) ! Ái(´): It is easy to














(k0) is compact, it follows
from Berge's Theorem that ci¤
t (´);k¤
t(´);li¤
t (´) are continuous functions of ´ for















Firstly, we consider the ¯rst three terms of Ái(´): Boundedness of ci¤
t (´);li¤
t (´);










































t (´) ¸ w¤
t(´)li¤
t (´):
(Note that if i = 2 I then ci¤
t (´) = 0;li¤
t (´) = 0):
























































t (´n) ! ci¤
t (´) > 0; li¤
t (´n) ! li¤

































































































t (´) implies that there
exist N such that for any n ¸ N; each term (i),(ii),(iii) is smaller than "
9:
The similar arguments can show that
#ir(´n)k0 ¡ ®i¼¤(´n) ! #ir(´)k0 ¡ ®i¼¤(´):
Hence, Ái(:) is a continuous function of ´:













i(´) = ¡Ái(´) if Ái(´) < 0; and Á
0
i(´) = 0 if Ái(´) ¸ 0: T is a continuous
mapping from the simplex into itself. By the Brouwer ¯xed point theorem,


















If ´i = 0, Proposition 4 (ii) implies that Ái(´i) < 0 and Á
0
i(´) > 0 :a contradic-





i(´) > 0; then ©
0
i(´) > 0; 8i: From the
de¯nition of Á
0









i(´) = 0 which implies Á
0
i(´) = 0; 8i: But
in this case we have Ái(´) ¸ 0; 8i: From Walras' Law we have Ái(´) = 0; 8i:
154 Conclusion
In this paper, we prove the existence of competitive equilibrium in an optimal
growth model with heterogeneous agents and elastic labor supply. This paper is
an extension of Le Van and Vailakis [2003] who studied the model without labor
supply. It is also the completeness of the important issue about the existence
of competitive equilibrium in the model of C. Le Van, M.H. Nguyen and Y.
Vailakis [2007]. Following the Negishi approach, our strategy for tackling the
question of existence relies on exploiting the link between Pareto-optima and
competitive equilibria. The proof is based on the result of existence of Lagrange
multipliers of the Pareto problem and their representation as a summable se-
quence. We show that there exists a Lagrange multiplier as a price system such
that together with the Pareto-optimal solution they constitute a price equilib-
rium with transfers. These transfers depend on the individual weights involved
in the social welfare function. An equilibrium exists provided that there is a
set of welfare weights such that the corresponding transfers equal zero.
5 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof: i) Let k0 > 0 but assume that k¤










there exists some i1 2 I such that c
¤i1




Assume the contrary that l¤i
1 = 0;8i 2 I. In this case, we prove that there
exists p with c
¤p
1 > 0: Indeed, if c¤i
1 = 0 8i 2 I then k¤
2 = f(0;m): Choose
" > 0 such that c
¤i1
0 > " + "2: Let ® = "+1
¯i1









0 ¡ (" + "2); ci
0 = c¤i
0 ; 8i 2 Infi1g
ii) c
i1
1 = ®"; ci
1 = 0; 8i 2 Infi1g
iii) li
0 = l¤i
0 ; 8i 2 I; l
i1
1 = °"; li





t ; 8i 2 I;8t ¸ 2
v) k1 = "; kt = k¤





0 + k1 =
c
¤i1














1 ) ¡ k2 ¡ c
i1
1
= f(";m ¡ °") ¡ f(0;m) ¡ ®"
¸ "[fk(";m ¡ °") ¡ fL(";m ¡ °")° ¡ ®]:
Due to the Inada conditions on F; the term inside the bracket is strictly positive
for " small enough. This proves feasibility of the alternative path.










































































0 )(" + "2):
If u
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0 )(" + "2)












0 )] ¸ 0:
If u
i1
cl · 0; then
¢(")
´i1





0 )(" + "2)
¸ ¯i1ui1





0 )(" + "2)
¸ ("2 + ")[ui1






17Due to the Inada conditions on ui1; the term inside the bracket becomes non-
negative for " small enough. A contradiction.
Thus, there exists p such that c
¤p
1 > 0: For this p; we claim that l
¤p
1 > 0:
Indeed, if this were false, de¯ne a feasible path as follows:
i) l
p
1 = "; li
1 = l¤i





1 + f(0;m ¡ ") ¡ f(0;m);ci
1 = c¤i





























































1;")(fL(0;m ¡ ") < +1: Hence, for
" > 0 small enough, ¢p(") > 0 : a contradiction. Thus, l
¤p
1 > 0:















t ; 8t ¸ 2;
ii) ci
t = c¤i
t 8i 6= p;8t and li
t = l¤i
t ; 8i;8t
iii) k1 = "; kt = k¤












































































0 ) < +1:
Hence, for " > 0 small enough, ¢p(") > 0 : a contradiction. It follows that
k¤
1 > 0: Working by induction we can show that k¤
t > 0 for any t:
ii) It follows from proposition 10 in C. Le Van, M.H Nguyen and Y. Vailakis
[2007] that there exists ° > 0 such that k¤
t > ° 8t. Suppose that there exist an
optimal paths (c¤;l¤;k¤) with c1¤
0 = 0;we can choose a feasible paths from this
optimal paths where we just repalce c1¤
0 ;k¤
t with c1
0 = "0 > 0; kt = k¤
t ¡ "t in
which f"tg is an increasing sequence bounded from above by ° ( for example,
"t = ° ¡ 1




t+1 ¡ "t+1 · f(k¤
t ¡ "t;L¤
t): This
feasible path create a new greater value than optimal value which leads to a
18contradiction. Thus c¤i
t > 0 for all t: It follows from (7) that l¤i
t > 0: (Otherwise,
¸1
t would not belong to l1
+).
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof: Consider ¸(´) = (¸
1;¸2i;¸3;¸4i;¸5i) of Proposition 1. Conditions
(7),(8),(9) in Proposition 1 show that 8i = 1:::m; @ui(ci¤
t ;li¤
t ) and @F(k¤
t;L¤
t)
are nonempty. Moreover,8t;8i = 1:::m; there exists ui
c(ci¤
t ;li¤






















t ) ¡ ¸1
t + ¸2i





















































t < +1;8i = 1:::m (13)



































t < +1: (14)
Given T; we multiply (11), for each i; by Li¤

















































t < +1;8i = 1:::m (17)
Thus, since Li¤
t = 1 ¡ li¤






















































































t ) > 0: Inada condition on function F together with
(8) imply that L¤







t belong to l+
1 nf0g: This completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 2
Proof: i) From Proposition 1 and Lemma 1, we get
c¤ 2 (l1
+ )m;l¤ 2 (l1
+ )m;k¤ 2 l1
+ ;p¤ 2 l+
1 nf0g;w¤ 2 l+
1 nf0g;r > 0:










































































































































This means (ci¤;li¤) solves the consumer's problem.













































































T ¡ kT) ¡ ¸1
T(k¤
T+1 ¡ kT+1):
































We have proved that the sequences (k¤;L¤) maximize the pro¯t of the ¯rm.
It is easy to see that market is clearing at the equilibrium.
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